We study the assignment of objects to people via lotteries based only on their ordinal preferences. In particular, we analyze the strategic implications of several natural assumptions regarding how people compare lotteries. These are that a person prefers a given lottery to: a) lotteries that it stochastically dominates with respect to his ordinal preferences, b) lotteries that do not stochastically dominate it with respect to his ordinal preferences, and c) lotteries that yield a lower expected utility for particular von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences consistent with his ordinal preferences.
Introduction
We study the use of lotteries to assign a set of objects to a set of people, in a way that each person receives exactly one object (Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979) . The data of the problem include each person's ordinal preferences over objects (Gibbard 1978, Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) . We extend these preferences to (incomplete) preferences over lotteries using first order stochastic dominance (SD ) as follows:
Suppose a person is asked to compare two lotteries over objects, π 0 and π 0 . Let us further suppose the following:
• He is at least as likely to receive his most preferred object under π 0 than π 0 .
• He is at least as likely to receive one of his two most preferred objects under π 0 than π 0 .
• And so on.
Then, we assume that this person finds π 0 at least as desirable as π 0 . This is equivalent to saying that for every possible von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences (consistent with his ordinal preferences) that he may have over the objects, his expected utility of π 0 is at least as high as that from π 0 .
Armed with an extension of preferences to lotteries, we consider notions of efficiency, equity, incentives, etc. We say that a (probabilistic) assignment is stochastic dominance (SD ) Pareto efficient if no other assignment makes at least one person better off in the SD sense while each other person is made either better off or has his component of the allocation unchanged (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) .
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This is equivalent to saying that the allocation is Pareto efficient for some von Neumann-Morgenstern preference profile that is consistent with the ordinal preference profile (McLennan 2002 , Manea 2008 , Athanassoglou 2010 ).
An assignment is SD envy-free if there is no pair of people such that one person prefers in the SD sense the other's lottery to the one assigned to him.
A rule is SD strategy-proof if, for each person, the lottery that the rule assigns to him when he honestly reports his preference relation is at least as desirable in the SD sense, according to his true preferences, as the lottery he receives when he reports any other preference relation.
It turns out that no SD strategy-proof rule selects an SD Pareto-efficient and SD envy-free allocation for each profile of preferences (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) . Though these three properties are incompatible, not all is lost. We consider implementation in Nash equilibria (Hurwicz 1978) in place of SD strategy-proofness. An advantage of doing so is that we can cover multivalued solutions.
A "game form" consists of a set of strategies for each person and an outcome function, a function that delivers an assignment for each profile of strategies. We refer to a pair consisting of a game form and a profile of preferences as a game. Since preferences over outcomes are incomplete, we have two natural forms of Nash equilibrium:
1. A strategy profile at which no person can unilaterally deviate in a way that makes him better off in the SD sense. We call these "weak stochastic dominance Nash equilibria." 2 2. A strategy profile at which for each person, each possible unilaterally deviation either makes him worse off in the SD sense or leaves his assignment unchanged. We call these "strong stochastic dominance Nash equilibria".
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If for each profile of preferences, the set of weak/strong SD Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of recommendations made by a particular solution, then that game form implements that solution in weak/strong SD Nash equilibria.
Alternatively, suppose that people have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, then the notion of "expected utility Nash equilibrium" is appropriate. A strategy profile is a expected utility Nash equilibrium if no person can unilaterally deviate in a way that he receives higher expected utility. Though we consider von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, we remind the reader that we are still interested in solutions that take as input only ordinal preferences over the alternatives and select lotteries over allocations.
4 However, when a person plays a game, he maximizes his expected utility. If for each profile of preferences, the set of expected utility Nash equilibrium outcomes of a game coincides with the set of recommendations made by a particular solution, then that game form implements that solution in expected utility Nash equilibria. For deterministic problems, an invariance condition, "Maskin-invariance", is necessary for implementability in expected utility Nash equilibria (Maskin 1999) .
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This condition, in conjunction with a condition called "no veto-power", is sufficient. 6 For private goods problems where people are satiable, such as the one that we study, no veto-power stands in contradiction with envy-freeness and other 2 Ekici and Kesten (2010) also study this type of equilibrium the preference revelation game associated with the Bogomolnaia-Moulin rule.
3 See Pais (2008) for a similar equilibrium concept applied to a particular class of two-sided matching games.
4 There are many real world situations where people are asked to submit an ordinal ranking of alternatives even though they have information about the intensities of their preferences. For instance, when parents fill out forms for school choice, they are asked only to rank schools.
5 This condition is commonly referred to as "Maskin monotonicity." 6 However, no veto-power itself is not necessary.
equity properties. 7 This makes the combination of Maskin-invariance and no vetopower too demanding. Several other sufficient conditions are weaker than this combination, but (in most settings) stronger than Maskin-invariance alone (Moore and Repullo 1990 , Sjöström 1991 , Danilov 1992 .
Still within the realm of deterministic allocation rules, to further weaken the sufficient conditions, we can consider permitting game forms that, for some strategy profiles, pick lotteries. These game forms can be designed such that for each profile of preferences, all of the equilibrium outcomes are deterministic. If we permit such game forms, for many settings, Maskin-invariance itself turns out not only to be a necessary condition but a sufficient condition as well (Bochet 2007, Benoît and Ok 2008) . However, these game forms relies on the "threat" of a lottery when lotteries are not feasible, which could be a shortcoming.
We are concerned with probabilistic allocation rules. Our main contribution is to identify a single necessary and sufficient condition for implementability in both kinds of SD Nash equilibria as well as the expected utility Nash equilibria. Thus, the three types of implementability are equivalent.
We show that many commonly studied rules and solutions are implementable by checking that they satisfy our mild condition. We also provide a characterization (for the three-person case) of the Bogomolnaia-Moulin rule as the only implementable rule that selects an SD Pareto-efficient and envy-free allocation. However, this result does not generalize to more than three people.
Note that the game form that implements a solution does not necessarily specify, as strategies, for each person the possible preference relations that he may announce. For the Bogomolnaia-Moulin rule, the weak stochastic dominance Nash equilibrium outcomes of such a game may be very different from what the rule selects (Ekici and Kesten 2010) . We provide a canonical game form for each type of equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formally describe our model and equilibrium concepts. In Section 3 we present various invariance conditions and show that they are, in fact, equivalent. In Section 4, we prove that our invariance condition is both necessary and sufficient for implementability. In Section 5 we describe some common solutions and rules in the literature. Then, we verify that they are implementable.
The Model
Let A be a set of objects and N be a set of people with |A| ≥ |N |. Each person i ∈ N ranks the objects in A according to a linear order P i . For each pair a, b ∈ A, we write a P i b if i prefers a to b. Let P be the set of all such linear orders over A. A preference profile is a list P ≡ (P i ) i∈N ∈ P N . Let u i : A → R be a von Neumann-Morgenstern preference. Let U be the set of von NeumannMorgenstern preferences. For each P i ∈ P, we say that u i is consistent with P i if for each a, b ∈ N , a P i b if and only if u i (a) > u i (b). Denote by U(P i ) the set of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences consistent with P i . A profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences is a list u ≡ (u i ) i∈N ∈ U N . For each
be the set of all lotteries.
8 An allocation is a list π ≡ (π i ) i∈N ∈ Π such that, for each a ∈ A \ {∅}, i∈N π i (a) ≤ 1. Let Π be the set of all allocations.
9 For each
Let P 0 ∈ P and let a 1 , . . . , a n be the labeling of A such that a 1 P 0 a 2 . . . P 0 a n . For each pair π 0 , π 0 ∈ ∆(A), π 0 stochastically dominates π 0 0 at P 0 -we denote this as
with at least one strict inequality (See Figure 1 ). For each P i ∈ P and each a ∈ A, let the upper contour set of P 0 at a be U C(P 0 , a) ≡ {b ∈ A : b P 0 a} ∪ {a}. Similarly, let the lower contour set of P 0 at a be LC(P 0 , a) ≡ {b ∈ A : a P 0 b} ∪ {a}.
For each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), let the stochastic dominance lower contour set of Figure 3 ). Let the stochastic dominance upper contour set of P 0 at π 0 be U Figure 2 ). Both L sd (P 0 , π 0 ) and U sd (P 0 , π 0 ) are closed sets. A solution is a correspondence ϕ : P N ⇒ Π such that for each P ∈ P N ,
A rule is a single-valued solution.
8 For each π 0 ∈ ∆(A) and each a ∈ A, π 0 (a) denotes the probability of receiving a under π 0 . 9 Alternatively, we can introduce q a ∈ N copies of each a ∈ A. Then, an allocation changes to be such that for each a ∈ A \ {∅}, i∈N π i (a) ≤ q a . The same argument throughout this paper applies.
10 Note that P sd 0 is not a complete binary relation over ∆(A).
Figure 1: Suppose that a person prefers object a to object b to object c. Since the lottery π 0 places greater probability on {a} and {a, b} than π 0 , π 0 stochastically dominates π 0 at this person's preferences.
A game form is a pair Γ = (S, h) with S ≡ S 1 × · · · × S n and h : S → Π. For each i ∈ N, S i is i's strategy space. We call h an outcome function: it associates each profile of strategies with an outcome in Π.
There are three alternative behavioral assumptions that we can work with. Suppose that a person does not know his own von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences exactly, but only knows his ordinal preferences. Since stochastic dominance relation is not complete, given a pair of lotteries, he may not be able to compare them in the SD sense. The first behavioral assumption is that he prefers one lottery to another only if it yields a higher expected value for every von NeumannMorgenstern preference consistent with his ordinal preference. The second is that he prefers one lottery to another as long as it yields a higher expected value for some von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. Finally, if a person knows his own von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences exactly, then he prefers one lottery to another if it yields higher expected utility. The following three equilibrium notions correspond to these three behavioral assumptions.
Let P ∈ P N , and s ∈ S. We say that s is a weak stochastic dominance Nash equilibrium of (Γ, P ) if for each i ∈ N , there is no s i ∈ S i such that (see Figure 2 )
sd (Γ, P ) be the set of all weak SD Nash equilibria of (Γ, P ).
We say that s is a strong stochastic dominance Nash equilibrium of (Γ, P ) Figure 2 : Illustration of weak SD Nash equilibrium Suppose that for if for each i ∈ N and s i ∈ S i either (see Figure 3 )
Let sN E sd (Γ, P ) be the set of all strong SD Nash equilibria of (Γ, P ). Figure 3 : Illustration of strong SD Nash equilibrium Suppose that for
Let u ∈ U N and s ∈ S. We say that s is a expected utility Nash equilibrium of (Γ, u) if for each i ∈ N, s i ∈ argmax s i ∈S i U i (h(s i , s −i )). Let N E(Γ, u) be the set of all expected utility Nash equilibria of (Γ, u).
Let ϕ : P N ⇒ Π be a solution. A game form Γ implements ϕ in weak stochastic dominance Nash equilibria if, for each P ∈ P N , h(wN E sd (Γ, P )) = ϕ(P ). 11 12 A solution is implementable in weak stochastic dominance Nash equilibria if there is a game form that implements it in weak SD Nash equilibria. Similarly, Γ implements ϕ in strong stochastic dominance Nash equilibria if for each P ∈ P N , h(sN E sd (Γ, P )) = ϕ(P ). A solution is implementable in strong stochastic dominance Nash equilibria if there is a game form that implements it in strong SD Nash equilibria. Let ρ : U → P be a mapping that associates each von Neumann-Morgenstern preference relation with the ordinal preference relation it is consistent with. That is, for each u 0 ∈ U, u 0 ∈ U(ρ(u 0 )). Thus ϕ • ρ maps von Neumann-Morgenstern preference profiles to feasible allocations. Thus, Γ implements ϕ in expected utility Nash equilibria if for each
A solution is implementable in expected utility Nash equilibria if there is a game form that implements it in expected utility Nash equilibria.
To conclude this section, we show for each preference profile, that a strong SD Nash equilibrium of the game (consisting of a game form and a profile of ordinal preferences) is a expected utility Nash equilibrium of every game consisting of the same game form and a von Neumann-Morgenstern preference profile consistent with the ordinal preference profile. Further, for each preference profile, a weak SD Nash equilibrium consisting of a game form and a profile of ordinal preferences is a expected utility Nash equilibrium of some game consisting of the same game form and a von Neumann-Morgenstern preference profile consistent with the ordinal preference profile. Proposition 1. For each Γ, each P ∈ P N , and each u ∈ U(P ),
In the Appendix 1, we present an example showing that sN E sd (Γ, P ) N E(Γ, u) wN E sd (Γ, P ).
Invariance Conditions
For each P 0 ∈ P and each B ⊆ A, let the top alternative under P 0 in B, denoted by τ (P 0 , B), be the alternative a ∈ B such that for each b ∈ B \ {a}, a P 0 b. For convenience, we usually drop A in the expression τ (P 0 , A) and write τ (P 0 ) instead. That is, when the second argument is omitted, it is A. Let ϕ : P N ⇒ Π. The following is an invariance condition similar to the Maskin-style conditions that are central to the literature on implementation.
For each P 0 ∈ P, each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), and each P 0 ∈ P 0 , we say that P 0 0 is a monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 if, for each a ∈ A such that π 0 (a) > 0 and each b ∈ A such that a P 0 b, a P 0 b. The reader may find it helpful to think of P 0 as a "Maskin-monotonic transformation" (Maskin 1999) of P 0 at each a ∈ supp(π 0 ). Invariance to monotonic transformations: For each P ∈ P N , each π ∈ ϕ(P ), and each P ∈ P N , if for each i ∈ N , P i is a monotonic transformation of P i at π i , then ϕ(P ) π.
For each u 0 ∈ U, each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), and each u 0 ∈ U, we say that u
Maskin-invariance:
13 (Maskin 1999 
Through Propositions 2 and 4, we establish a link between Maskin-invariance and invariance to monotonic transformations.
Thus, since every Maskin-monotonic transformation of a von Neumann-Morgenstern profile corresponds to a monotonic transformation of the original ordinal preferences, we have the following:
13 In the literature, this is commonly referred to as "Maskin monotonicity." Proposition 3. Maskin invariance implies invariance to monotonic transformations.
While the converse of Proposition 3 is not true, there is nonetheless a close relation between the two forms of invariance.
Proposition 4. For each P 0 , P 0 ∈ P and each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), if P 0 is a monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 , then there are u 0 ∈ U(P 0 ) and u 0 ∈ U(P 0 ) such that u 0 is a Maskin transformation of u 0 at π 0 .
Proof. Let P 0 , P 0 ∈ P and π 0 ∈ ∆(A). Let u 0 ∈ U(P 0 ). Since P 0 is a monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 , we can find u 0 ∈ U(P 0 ) such that for each a ∈ supp(π 0 ), u 0 (a) = u 0 (a), and for each a / ∈ supp(π 0 ),
The first inequality and the last equality come from the construction of u 0 . Thus, u 0 is a Maskin transformation of u 0 at π 0 .
The following two conditions are invariance conditions based on different notions of transformations of preferences. They are stated in terms of SD relations.
For each P 0 ∈ P, each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), and each P 0 ∈ P, we say that P 0 0 is a strong stochastic dominance monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 if,
That is, only lotteries that dominate π 0 at P 0 dominate π 0 at P 0 (see Figure 4) .
Weak invariance to stochastic dominance monotonic transformations:
For each P ∈ P N , each π ∈ ϕ(P ), and each P ∈ P N , if for each i ∈ N , P i is a strong SD monotonic transformation of
Lotteries that dominate π 0 under R 0 .
Figure 4: The pair P 0 , P 0 ∈ P is such that P 0 is a strong SD monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 .
Proposition 5. Weak invariance to SD monotonic transformations is equivalent to invariance to monotonic transformations.
Proof. We prove this by showing that for each pair P 0 , P 0 ∈ P and each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), P 0 is a strong SD monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 if and only if it is a monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 . That is,
(⇒) Let π 0 ∈ U sd (P 0 , π 0 ). Suppose that there is a pair a, b ∈ A such that a P 0 b and b P 0 a but π 0 (a) > 0. Let π 0 ∈ ∆(A) be defined by setting, for each c ∈ A,
with at least one strict inequality. Thus, π i ∈ U (P 0 , π 0 ).
Next, we introduce another invariance property. For each P 0 ∈ P, each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), and each P 0 ∈ P we say that P 0 0 is a weak stochastic dominance monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 if,
That is, all lotteries dominated by π 0 at P 0 are dominated by π 0 at P 0 (see Figure 5) .
Strong invariance to stochastic dominance monotonic transformations:
For each P ∈ P N , each π ∈ ϕ(P ), and each P ∈ P N , if for each i ∈ N , P i is a weak SD monotonic transformation of P i at π i , then ϕ(P ) π.
The following result is parallel to Proposition 5. Lotteries dominated by π 0 under R 0 .
Figure 5: The pair P 0 , P 0 ∈ P is such that P 0 is a weak SD monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 .
Proof. We prove this by showing that for each pair P 0 , P 0 ∈ P and each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), P 0 is a weak SD monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 if and only if it is a monotonic transformation of P 0 at π 0 . That is,
(⇐) Suppose that for each pair a, b ∈ A, if a P 0 b and b P 0 a, then π 0 (a) = 0. Let a 1 , . . . , a k be a labeling of supp(π 0 ) such that a 1 P 0 . .
with at least one strict inequality. Thus, π 0 ∈ L sd (P 0 , π 0 ).
Propositions 5 and 6 establish the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Strong invariance to SD monotonic transformations is equivalent to weak invariance to SD monotonic transformations.
Intuitively, this is because of the "sparseness" of the domain of preferences: there are only |A|! of them.
A natural question to ask is whether implementability is preserved under intersection, union, or convex combination of solutions.
Proposition 8. If Φ is a collection of solutions that are invariant to monotonic transformations, then:
1. Φ is invariant to monotonic transformations and 2. If Φ is well defined, it is invariant to monotonic transformations.
Proof. ( Φ) Let P ∈ P N and π ∈ ( Φ)(P ). Then, there is φ ∈ Φ such that π ∈ φ(P ). Let P ∈ P N be a monotonic transformation of P at π. By invariance to monotonic transformations, π ∈ φ(P ). Thus, π ∈ ( Φ)(P ).
( Φ) Let P ∈ P N and π ∈ ( Φ)(P ). Then, for each π ∈ Φ, π ∈ φ(P ). Let P ∈ P N be a monotonic transformation of P at π. By invariance to monotonic transformations, for each φ ∈ Φ, π ∈ φ(P ). Thus, π ∈ ( Φ)(P ).
The reader familiar with the literature on implementation would know implementability is commonly preserved under intersection and union.
14 However, that it is also preserved under convex combination is a departure from usual results.
Proposition 9. If φ and ϕ are invariant to monotonic transformations, then for each α ∈ (0, 1), (αφ + (1 − α)ϕ) is invariant to monotonic transformations.
Proof. Let P ∈ P N , α ∈ (0, 1), π ∈ φ(P ), and π ∈ ϕ(P ). Let π ≡ (απ+(1−α)π) ∈ (αφ + (1 − α)ϕ)(P ). Let P ∈ P N be a monotonic transformation of P at π. For each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A, π i (a) = 0 if and only if π i (a) = π i (a) = 0. Thus, P is a monotonic transformation of P at both π and π. By invariance to monotonic transformations, π ∈ φ(P ) and πϕ(P ). Thus, π ∈ (αφ + (1 − α)ϕ)(P ).
Necessity and Sufficiency for Implementability
We begin with results on implementability in strong SD Nash equilibria and then in weak SD Nash equilibria.
Implementability in strong stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
We show that invariance to monotonic transformations is a necessary and sufficient condition for implementability in strong SD Nash equilibria.
Proposition 10. Implementability in strong SD Nash equilibria implies invariance to monotonic transformations.
Proof. Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 in Maskin (1999) . The difference is that we appeal to Proposition 6 and strong invariance to SD monotonic transformations instead of Maskin-invariance.
For each a ∈ A, let δ a ∈ ∆(A) be such that δ a (a) = 1. Let D ≡ {δ a : a ∈ A}.
Theorem 1. For |N | ≥ 3, invariance to monotonic transformations implies implementability in strong SD Nash equilibria.
Proof. Let ϕ be a rule that is invariant to monotonic transformations. Letπ ∈ Π be such that, for each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A,π i (a) ≡
Denote a generic member of S i by
if for each i ∈ N , s i = (P, π, σ, n), and π ∈ ϕ(P ) Let Γ ≡ (S, h).
16
We claim that for each P ∈ P N , sN E sd (Γ, P ) = ϕ(P ).
(⊇) Let π ∈ ϕ(P ). Let s ∈ S be such that for each i ∈ N , s i = (P, π, π, 0). For each i ∈ N and each
(⊆) Recall that for each P 0 ∈ P and each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), L sd (P 0 , π 0 ) is closed. Thus,
Case 1: For each i ∈ N , s i = (P, π, σ, n) and π ∈ ϕ(P ). Then, for each i ∈ N ,
). This contradicts s ∈ sN E sd (Γ, T P ). Since π ∈ ϕ(P ), by invariance to monotonic transformations and Proposition 6,
Case 2: There is i ∈ N such that, for each j ∈ N \ {i}, s j = (P, π, σ, n) = s i .
Letπ ≡ h(s). Then for each j ∈ N \ {i},π j = δ τ ( T P j ) : otherwise, let s j ∈ S j be such that n j ≡ max{n i , n} + 1, σ j ≡π, P j ∈ P N , and π j ∈ Π be such that
Sinceπ ∈ Π and for each j ∈ N \ {i},π j = δ τ (
Thus,π = σ i so,π = π. This implies that L sd (
This contradicts s ∈ sN E sd (Γ, T P ). Since π ∈ ϕ(P ), by invariance to monotonic transformations and Proposition 6, π ∈ ϕ( T P ).
Case 3: There is a triple i, j, k ∈ N such that s i = s j , s i = s k , and s j = s k . Let π ≡ h(s).
Note that σ i * and π i * are interchanged.
( Figure 6 (c) 
and n i * > n i * and is large enough that
For each of the above cases,
Figure 6: Illustration of the proof of Theorem 1 For each sub-case of 3.1, we see that 
Remark. There are two potential objections to this game form. The first is the game announcing integers. However, the integer game is commonly used in literatures on implementation. The second is the ability of each person to approximate but not exactly achieve any possible outcome. To address the second, we could impose weak unanimity, Weak unanimity :
which is a very mild efficiency condition. We provide an alternative game form without such approximation by imposing weak unanimity in the Appendix 2. Through Theorem 1, Proposition 6, and Proposition 10 we have established the following: Corollary 1. Invariance to monotonic transformations is equivalent to implementability in strong SD Nash equilibria.
Implementability in weak stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
We next show that invariance to monotonic transformations is a necessary and sufficient condition for implementability in weak SD Nash equilibria. The following results are parallel to those in Section 4.1.
Proposition 11. Implementability in weak SD Nash equilibria implies invariance to monotonic transformations.
Proof. Proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 in Maskin (1999) . The difference is that we appeal to Proposition 5 and weak invariance to SD monotonic transformations instead of Maskin-invariance.
Theorem 2. For |N | ≥ 3, invariance to monotonic transformations implies implementability in weak SD Nash equilibria.
Proof. Let ϕ be a rule that is invariant to monotonic transformations. Letπ ∈ Π be such that, for each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A,
Define h : S → Π by setting, for each s ∈ S,
and π i * = σ i * , where i * ≡ min arg max j∈N n j , and π otherwise.
Let Γ ≡ (S, h). We claim that for each P ∈ P N , wN E sd (Γ, P ) = ϕ(P ).
(⊆) Recall that for each P 0 ∈ P and each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), U sd (P 0 , π 0 ) is closed. Thus, for each P 0 ∈ P such that U
Case 1: For each i ∈ N , s i = (P, π, σ, n) and π ∈ ϕ(P ). Then, for each i ∈ N , U sd (
. Since π ∈ ϕ(P ), by invariance to monotonic transformations and Proposition 5,
Remark. As in Theorem 1, we can impose weak unanimity on a solution, and modify the mechanism used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Through Theorem 2, Proposition 5, and Proposition 11 we have established the following:
Corollary 2. Invariance to monotonic transformations is equivalent to implementability in weak SD Nash equilibria.
Implementability in expected utility Nash equilibria
We conclude this section by discussing a final behavioral assumption. While we still study ordinal solutions, each person maximizes his expected utility. The following results are parallel to those in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Proposition 12. Implementability in expected utility Nash equilibria implies invariance to monotonic transformations.
Proof. From Theorem 2 in Maskin (1999) , if ϕ is implementable in expected utility Nash equilibria, then ϕ is Maskin-invariant. By Proposition 3, ϕ is invariant to monotonic transformations.
Theorem 3. For |N | ≥ 3, invariance to monotonic transformations implies implementability in expected utility Nash equilibria.
Denote a generic member of
Let Γ ≡ (S, h).
We claim that for each
(⊆) Recall that for each u 0 ∈ U and each
Since π ∈ ϕ•ρ(u), by invariance to monotonic transformations and Proposition 2,
, and π j ∈ Π be such that
Sinceπ ∈ Π and for each j ∈ N \ {i},π j = δ
Thus,π = σ i so,π = π. This implies that L(
Remark. As in Theorems 1 and 2, we can impose weak unanimity on a solution, and modify the mechanism used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Through Theorem 3, and Propositions 3 and 12 we have established the following:
Corollary 3. Invariance to monotonic transformations is equivalent to implementability in expected utility Nash equilibria.
Finally, through Corollaries 1, 2, and 3 we have established our main equivalence result.
Corollary 4. The following are equivalent:
1. implementability in strong SD Nash equilibria, 2. implementability in weak SD Nash equilibria, and 3. implementability in expected utility Nash equilibria.
Applications
In this section, we describe several solutions (Section 5.1) and rules and verify that they are implementable (Section 5.2). In Section 5.3 we show that implementability is not a vacuous property by describing a rule that violates it. In Section 5.4 we prove a characterization for three-person economies.
Solutions and rules
We list some prominent solutions in the literature. We first define the Pareto solution with regards to stochastic dominance.
Stochastic dominance Pareto solution, P sd : For each P ∈ P N , P sd (P ) ≡ {π ∈ Π : there is no π ∈ Π such that for each i ∈ N , π i P sd i π i }.
The next solution selects every allocation with the property that each person finds his assignment to be not only comparable in the SD sense, but also at least as desirable as anybody else's assignment (Foley 1967, Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) .
Strong stochastic dominance no-envy solution, sF sd : For each P ∈ P N ,
Figure 7: Illustration of sF sd For each i ∈ N and j ∈ N \ {i}, π i either coincides with or stochastically dominates π j . That is, if a P i b P i c, then π j is in the shaded region.
The following is more permissive than sF sd and drops the requirement of comparability.
Weak stochastic dominance no-envy solution, wF sd : For each P ∈ P N , wF sd (P ) = {π ∈ Π : for each i ∈ N , there is no j ∈ N such that π j P sd i π i .}
The following solution is associated with a reference assignment, ω ∈ Π. 18 For each i ∈ N , ω i is a lower bound on i's welfare: he is assigned a lottery that he finds at least as desirable as ω i in the SD sense (Athanassoglou and Sethuraman 2010) . We next define a few single-valued solutions, or rules, that are central to the literature on random assignment.
Let θ : N → {1, · · · , n} be a one-to-one mapping from N to itself. Let Θ be the set of all such mappings. Each member of the following class of rules that we describe is indexed by such an ordering and sequentially assigns each person his most preferred object, among those remaining, with certainty.
The sequential dictatorial solution associated with θ ∈ Θ, D " : For each P ∈ P N , D θ (P ) ≡ π ∈ Π defined as follows:
. . . a n ∈ A \ {a 1 , . . . , a n−1 }, and π θ(n) (a n ) ≡ 1
The next rule can be thought of as uniformly randomizing over all n! possible elements of Θ and then applying the relevant sequential dictatorship rule.
The random priority rule, RP :
We define our last rule via the following algorithm (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) : Let P ∈ P N . Consider each object as a single unit of an infinitely divisible good. Let T ∈ R ++ . From t = 0 to t = T , each i ∈ N collects the fraction of exactly one object at a time, at a speed of of P i . That is, at t = 0, each i starts by collecting τ (P i , A). When this good is exhausted, at time t, let the objects remaining at a positive level be A t . Each i ∈ N then moves to τ (P i , A t ), and collects its fraction. This continues until time t = T when every good is exhausted. At this point, each person has collected a total of one unit.
The Bogomolnaia-Moulin rule, BM : For each P ∈ P N , BM (P ) ≡ π ∈ Π where for each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A, π i (a) is the amount of a that i "collects" during the above algorithm at P .
Implementability of solutions and rules
We next show that invariance to monotonic transformation is a weak requirement. All of the solutions introduced in Section 5.1 are invariant to monotonic transformations (Propositions 13 and 14).
Proposition 13. The solutions P sd , sF sd , wF sd , and for each ω ∈ Π, B sd ω are invariant to monotonic transformations.
Proof. We prove the invariance of each solution, one by one:
(P sd ) Let P ∈ P N , π ∈ P sd (P ), and P ∈ P N . Suppose for the sake of contradiction, that P is a monotonic transformation of P at π and that π / ∈ P sd (P ). Then there are a list of people (i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i k ) and a list of objects (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a k ) such that for each l ∈ {1, · · · , k}, (i) π i l (a (l+1) mod k ) > 0, and (ii) a l P i l a (l+1) mod k . (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) Since P ∈ P N is a monotonic transformation of P at π, for each l ∈ {1, · · · , k}, a l P i l a (l+1) mod k . This contradicts π ∈ P sd (P ).
(sF sd ) Let P ∈ P N and π ∈ sF sd (P ). Then, for each pair i, j ∈ N , π i P
N be a monotonic transformation of P at π. Then, for each k ∈ N and each a ∈ A such that π k (a) > 0, LC(P k , a) ⊆ LC(P k , a). Thus, for each pair i, j ∈ N and each a ∈ A such that π i (a) > 0,
Thus, π i P sd i π j and so π ∈ sF sd (P ).
(wF sd ) Let P ∈ P N and π ∈ F sd (P ). Then, there is no pair i, j ∈ N such that π j P sd i π i . That is, for each pair i, j ∈ N , there is a ∈ A such that π i (a) > 0 and b∈LC(P i ,a) π i (b) ≤ b∈LC(P i ,a) π j (b). Let P ∈ P N be a monotonic transformation of P at π. Then, for each k ∈ N and each a ∈ A such that π k (a) > 0, LC(P k , a) ⊆ LC(P k , a). Thus, for each pair i, j ∈ N there is a ∈ A such that π i (a) > 0 and
Thus, π i P sd i π j and so π ∈ wF sd (P ).
(B sd ! ) Let P ∈ P N and π ∈ B sd ω (P ). Then, for each i ∈ N , π P sd i ω i . Let P ∈ P N be a monotonic transformation of P at π. Then, for each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A with π i (a) > 0, LC(P i , a) ⊆ LC(P i , a). Thus, for each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A such that π i (a) > 0,
sd ω are implementable in both strong and weak SD Nash equilibria.
As a corollary of Proposition 8 and Corollary 5, we can make statements about more solutions of interest, such as P sd ∩ sF sd and for each ω ∈ Π, P sd ∩ B sd ω (both of which are well defined (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001, Athanassoglou and Sethuraman 2010) ). The first statement is in contrast with the result that no selection from P sd ∩ sF sd is SD strategy-proof 20 (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) . The second is in contrast with the result that for each ω ∈ Π, no selection from P sd ∩ B sd ω is SD strategy-proof (Athanassoglou and Sethuraman 2010) . The contrast between these results is even more interesting since there are SD strategyproof selections from each of P sd , sF sd , and for each ω ∈ Π, B ω but not from their intersections.
Corollary 6.
1. The solution P sd ∩ sF sd is invariant to monotonic transformations, and 2. For each ω ∈ Π, the solution P sd ∩ B sd ω is invariant to monotonic transformations. 20 Suppose that for each i ∈ N , S i = P. A rule ϕ is SD strategy-proof if for each P ∈ P N , each i ∈ N , and each P i ∈ P, either ϕ(P ) P sd i ϕ(P i , P −i ) or ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P i , P −i ).
Remark. Since invariance to monotonic transformations is preserved under arbitrary intersection, it is possible to compute the "minimal invariant enlargement" of a rule that violates it (Sen 1995 , Thomson 1999 ).
Next, we verify that the rules introduced in Section 5.1 are invariant to monotonic transformations.
Proposition 14. BM, RP, and for each θ ∈ Θ, D θ are invariant to monotonic transformations.
Proof. It follows directly from the definitions of BM and D θ that they are invariant to monotonic transformations. Since RP is a convex combination of D θ s, by Proposition 9, RP is also invariant to monotonic transformations.
Corollary 7. BM, RP, and for each θ ∈ Θ, D θ are implementable in both strong and weak SD Nash equilibria.
An example of a rule violating invariance to monotonic transformations
To verify that invariance to monotonic transformations is not a vacuous property, we present an example of a solution that violates it. For each P 0 ∈ P and each π 0 ∈ ∆(A), let C(P 0 , π 0 ) be the upper contour set of P 0 in supp(π 0 ) at the worst object. That is, C(P 0 , π 0 ) ≡ a∈supp(π 0 ) U C(P 0 , a). The objective of the next solution is to minimize the size of this set across all people.
Example 1. For each P ∈ P N , let ϕ(P ) ≡ argmin π∈Π {max i∈N |C(P i , π i )|}.
Let N = {1, 2, 3}, A ≡ {a, b, c}, and let the pair P, P ∈ P N be such that: 
)
It is easy to check that π ∈ ϕ(P ). Further, for each π ∈ ϕ(P ), π 3 (c) = 1. However, for each i ∈ N , P i is a monotonic transformation of P i at π i , yet π / ∈ ϕ(P ).
A three-person characterization of the BM rule
We end this section with a characterization of the BM rule for the three-person case, as the only selection from P sd ∩ sF sd that is invariant to monotonic transformations. However, this characterization does not extend to more than three people.
Proposition 15. For |N | = 3, BM is the only selection from P sd ∩ sF sd that is invariant to monotonic transformations.
Proof. Since BM ⊆ P sd ∩ sF sd (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) and is invariant to monotonic transformations (Proposition 14), it suffices to show that if ϕ ⊆ P sd ∩ sF sd is invariant to monotonic transformations, then ϕ ≡ BM . Let N ≡ {1, 2, 3}, A ≡ {a, b, c}. Up to relabeling of people and objects, the following list of (partial) profiles of preferences is exhaustive:
Profile 2: Profile 3:
P 1 P 2 P 3 a b c . . . . . . . . . Profiles 1-4: Since ϕ ⊆ P sd ∩ sF sd , the choice of ϕ is pinned down and coincides with the recommendation made by the BM rule.
N E(Γ, u) wN E sd (Γ, P ). Let N ≡ {1, 2, 3} and let Γ = (P, BM ). Let P 0 , P 0 , P 1 , P 1 ∈ P be such that P 0 P 0 P 1 P 1 a b b b a a c a c c a c
Let ϕ be a rule that is weakly unanimous and invariant to monotonic transformations. For each i ∈ N, let
Denote a generic member of S i by s i ≡ (P i , π i , σ i , n i ).
if for each i ∈ N , s i = (P, π, σ, n), and π ∈ ϕ(P )
if there is i ∈ N such that for each j ∈ N \ {i}, s j = (P, π, σ, n) = s i = (P i , π i , σ i , n i ) and σ Let Γ ≡ (S, h). To prove that for each P ∈ P N , sN E sd (Γ, P ) = ϕ(P ), the same arguments apply as in the proof of Theorem 1 except Cases 2 and 3.
Letπ ≡ h(s). Then for each j ∈ N \ {i},π j = δ τ ( T P j ) : otherwise, let s j ∈ S j be such that n j ≡ max{n i , n} + 1, π j ∈ Π, P j ∈ P N , and σ j ∈ Π be such that Thus, for each j ∈ N \ {i},π j = δ τ ( T P j ) . Sinceπ ∈ Π, we know thatπ i ∈ D. Thus, π = σ i so,π = π. This implies that L sd (
). This contradicts s ∈ sN E sd (Γ, T P ). Since π ∈ ϕ(P ), by invariance to monotonic transformations and Proposition 6, π ∈ ϕ( T P ).
Case 3: There is a triple i, j, k ∈ N such that s i = s j , s i = s k , and s j = s k . Let π ≡ h(s). Then, for each l ∈ N ,π l = δ τ ( T P l ) l : otherwise, let s j ∈ S j be such that n j ≡ max{n i , n} + 1, π j ∈ Π, P j ∈ P N , and σ j ∈ Π be such that π 
